Agency theory: a review in finance

Basit Öğe Kaydı
dc.contributor.authorTekın, Hasan
dc.contributor.authorPolat, Ali Yavuz
dc.date.accessioned2024-09-29T16:29:23Z
dc.date.available2024-09-29T16:29:23Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.departmentKarabük Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractThe problems of agency and risk sharing arise due to the separation of ownership and control of a large firm, when conflicts of interest exist between principals (owners) and agents (managers). The main source of these problems is asymmetric information, which implies an agency cost for the principal. Agency theory, which is still one of the fundamental theories in corporate finance, focuses on minimizing costs in agency relations. This study critically evaluates the principal-agent relations, focusing on the interaction between the shareholder-manager and bondholder-shareholder in corporate finance.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.18506/anemon.712351
dc.identifier.endpage1329en_US
dc.identifier.issn2147-7655
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.startpage1323en_US
dc.identifier.trdizinid416316en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.18506/anemon.712351
dc.identifier.urihttps://search.trdizin.gov.tr/tr/yayin/detay/416316
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14619/10496
dc.identifier.volume8en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakTR-Dizinen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofAnemon Muş Alparslan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisien_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Ulusal Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.titleAgency theory: a review in financeen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

Dosyalar

Koleksiyon

TR-Dizin İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu